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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to the 
provisions of Utah Code Annotated, Section 78, Chapter 2a, Section 3, 
Subsection (h): 
"appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, 
including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, 
support, visitation, adoption, and paternity(.)" 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
ISSUE I: Did the trial court adequately take into account the elements 
set out in Jones1 in awarding alimony? 
Standard of Review: The trial court's conclusions of law with respect 
to alimony are reviewed for correctness, but the court's findings of fact will not 
be reversed unless they are clearly erroneous. Willey v. Willev. 914 P.2d 1149 
(Utah App. 1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Nature of the case: Appellee accepts Appellant's statement regarding the 
nature of the case. 
1
 Jones v. Jones. 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985). 
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b. Course of the proceedings: Mrs. Tornow's Complaint for Divorce was filed in 
the Second Judicial District Court on 11 July, 1996. R. 297. In prior hearings 
before that court, beginning on 26 July 1996, she was awarded temporary child 
support of $1,406.00 per month and temporary alimony of $500.00 per month. 
R. 341. Mr. Tornow subsequently terminated his first counsel. R. 304. On 18 
February 1997 the trial judge in a telephone conference with counsel for the 
parties, including Mr. Tornow's new counsel, set the matter for trial on 28 April 
1997. R. 302. 
When the parties and counsel first appeared before the court at the time 
set for trial on 28 April 1997, Mr. Tornow's counsel believed the matter had 
been resolved. R. 296. A written stipulation covering all outstanding issues 
upon which counsel for the parties believed agreement had been reached, had 
been submitted to Mr. Tornow's counsel by Mrs. Tornow's counsel after a 
meeting between them on 14 April 1997. R. 298, 299, 300. However, Mr. 
Tornow, contrary to the advise of his counsel, insisted that the case be settled 
by trial. R. 297. The court would not at this late date grant his motion to 
postpone the trial. R. 302, 309. Thereupon Mr. Tornow fired his second 
attorney. R. 303, 309. The case proceeded to trial with Mr. Tornow 
representing himself. R. 310. 
At the trial Mrs. Tornow testified in her own behalf and called Toni 
Hughes, MSW, a therapist for the four older children, as a witness. Mr. Tornow 
cross examined both witnesses extensively, and was granted wide latitude by 
the court in questioning them. Mr. Tornow testified in his own behalf, and called 
his son, James, by a prior marriage, as a witness. Again, the court allowed wide 
latitude to Mr. Tornow both to testify and to submit exhibits into evidence. R. 
551. 
2 
c. Disposition of trial court: Appellee accepts Appellant's statement regarding 
the disposition of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The following facts were presented to the court to show (i) Mrs. Tornow's 
financial condition and needs, (ii) Mrs. Tornow's earning capacity and ability to 
produce income and (iii) Mr. Tornow's ability to provide support: 
1. Mrs. Tornow has sole custody of the five (5) children of the parties 
from 11 to 2 years of age. R. 312, 313. 
2. The nine-year-old daughter is a special needs child with cerebral 
palsy whose mobility is severely restricted. R. 313, 314. 
3. Mrs. Tornow received training in her native Italy as a dietitian and 
worked as a photographer by the time she was age 21. R. 338, 339. She was 
age 38 at the time of trial. R. 311. 
4. Mrs. Tornow has done some substitute teaching in the Davis County 
School District and wants to be a teacher. R. 339. 
5. Mrs. Tornow needs five (5) years of additional education to qualify for 
a full-time teaching job. R. 340. 
6. Mr. Tornow is trained as a computer analyst and has worked for his 
present employer for 11 years. R. 351. 
7. Mr. Tornow's monthly income is $4,833.00. R. 341, 515. 
8. Mr. Tornow computed and submitted his current monthly expenses at 
$1,400.00 for himself and his 15-year-old son by a prior marriage, which figure 
was accepted into evidence without objection. R. 515. 
9. The temporary order for alimony to Mrs. Tornow from September 1996 
to the time of the trial on 28 April 1997 was $500.00 per month. R. 341. 
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10. Although Mrs. Tornow expressed a willingness to supplement her 
income with part-time work while completing her education to become a teacher 
(R. 341, 342), it will take most of her time for the next five years to care for the 
children and fulfill the educational requirements to become a teacher. FL 339, 
340, 558. 
11. The court took Mr. Tornow's gross monthly pay of $4,833.00, 
reduced by a reasonable allowance for taxes, scheduled child support and 
Appellant's stated monthly expenses for himself and his son by a prior 
marriage, as the basis for awarding Mrs. Tornow alimony of $500.00 per month. 
R. 564. 
12. The court specifically limited the payment of alimony to a maximum 
of five years or until Mrs. Tornow's prior remarriage or cohabitation. R. 564. 
ISSUE NUMBER I: SUMMARY 
Appellant's listing of three issues is but a subdividing of a single issue: 
Did the trial court adequately take into account the elements set out in Jones in 
awarding alimony. Mrs. Tornow's position is that the trial court based its award 
of alimony on the requirements enunciated in current case law2, and codified in 
current statutory rules3, with sufficient evidence in support thereof. These 
provisions, as they relate to this case, are (i) Mrs. Tornow's financial condition 
and needs, (ii) Mrs. Tornow's earning capacity and ability to produce income 
and (iii) Mr. Tornow's ability to provide support. 
2
 Jones v. Jones. 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985). 
3
 UCA 30-3-5 (7) (a) (Michie 1997). 
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ISSUE NUMBER I: ARGUMENT 
The factors enunciated in Jones are in aid of, and not in substitution for, 
the equitable powers and broad latitude of discretion of the trial court in 
determining alimony. As a preamble to those factors, the court in Jones set the 
background as follows: 
In a divorce proceeding, the trial court may make such orders 
concerning . . . alimony as are equitable. (Citation to then current statute 
omitted). The trial court has broad latitude in such matters, and orders 
distributing property and setting alimony will not be lightly disturbed. 
(Citations to predecessor cases omitted). However, the trial court must 
exercise its discretion in accordance with the standards that have been 
set by this Court.4 
Then quoting from English the purpose of alimony is reiterated as 
follows: 
[T]he most important function of alimony is to provide support for 
the wife as nearly as possible at the standard of living she enjoyed 
during marriage, and to prevent the wife from becoming a public charge.5 
From the twelve elements of the Statement of the Facts herein the 
following provide substantial and sufficient evidence to support the Jones 
factors in determining the award of alimony to Mrs. Tornow: 
(i) Regarding Mrs. Tornow's financial condition and need: 
Statement No. 1: As the sole custodian of five children under 11 
years of age, Mrs. Tornow's financial need to provide the necessities of life is 
self-evident. 
Statement No. 9: The temporary alimony at $500.00 per month 
was deemed appropriate to respond to the financial needs for almost 8 months. 
4
 Jonesr supra at 1074. 
5
 English v. English, 565 P.2d at 411 (Utah 1977). 
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(ii) Regarding Mrs. Tomow's earning capacity and ability to produce 
income: 
Statement No. 1: As the sole custodian of five children under 11 
years of age, Mrs. Tornow's ability to produce income is constricted by the 
demands of her role as the primary care giver. Historically she has been at 
home with the children and only recently has done some part-time work. 
Statement No. 2: The disability of the nine-year-old daughter, who 
requires extensive extra care and therapy, acts as an additional restriction upon 
the mother's availability for employment. 
Statement No. 3: Mrs. Tornow's training of some 17 years ago, 
prior to marriage and having children, has not been kept up; and is of limited 
value in terms of her present employability. 
Statement No. 4: Mrs. Tornow's exposure to teaching has opened 
her desire to pursue this profession as full-time work. However, she is currently 
unprepared to do so. 
Statement No. 5: Her need for five more years of education to 
qualify as a full-time teacher severely restricts her availability for employment 
during that period. 
Statement No. 10: Mrs. Tornow's expressed willingness to work 
while completing her education, though commendable, is not realistic in 
connection with the demands of caring for the children as sole custodian and 
fulfilling the educational requirements for the next five years. 
Statement No. 12: The court specifically limited the payment of 
alimony to a maximum period of five years to correspond with Mrs. Tornow's 
increased earning capacity achieved through additional education, 
(iii) Regarding Mr. Tornow's ability to provide support: 
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Statement No. 6: Mr. Tornow's current professional status and 
work history establish his ability to provide support. 
Statement No. 7: His monthly gross income is sufficient to provide 
the support requested. 
Statement No. 8: Mr. Tornow's monthly expense for support of 
himself and his 15-year-old son by a prior marriage, which he generated and 
submitted to the court himself, was deemed by the court to be reasonable and 
received into evidence without objection. 
Statement No. 9: The temporary order of alimony of $500.00 per 
month was in effect for 8 months prior to trial. 
Statement No. 11: The court made reasonable allowances for 
taxes, child support and Mr. Tornow's monthly expenses for himself and his 15-
year-old son by a prior marriage in adjusting Mr. Tornow's gross monthly 
income before awarding $500.00 per month as alimony from the remainder. 
Statement No. 12: The court's limitation of the alimony for a period 
not to exceed five years benefited Mr. Tornow, since the court could have 
ordered alimony for a longer period. 
It is clear from the foregoing that the trial court appropriately used the 
factors from Jones as an aid in applying its discretion to resolve the alimony 
issue. This process was endorsed by the Court of Appeals as follows: 
[T]he trial court must make sufficiently detailed findings of fact on 
each factor to enable a reviewing court to ensure that the trial court's 
discretionary determination was rationally based upon these three 
factors.6 
An additional comment is warranted because of the circumstances 
created by defendant which threatened to tip the proceedings off the edge into 
chaos at several turns, as set out in the Statement of the Case, supra. The trial 
6
 Bell v. Bell. 810 P.2d at 492 (Utah App. 1991). 
7 
judge successfully maneuvered through these treacherous shoals with an eye 
to requiring respect for the court and its processes, and not allowing defendant 
to swing too far off course; while at the same time giving defendant ample lee-
way to emphasize the points he desired and get into evidence the documents 
he wanted admitted. Defendant by his own choice created the situation of 
proceeding to trial without counsel. It was the court's determination that this 
choice would not be allowed to derail the proceedings and delay resolution of 
the pressing issues therein. 
It must also be remembered that the trial judge was dealing with several 
complex and contested matters besides alimony. In the midst of a long day's 
trial, and the over-riding concern for allowing defendant a fair hearing, while at 
the same time not permitting control of the court's processes by defendant's 
choices, the trial judge heard, received and evaluated sufficient evidence on the 
issue of alimony, and many others, to reach the conclusion entered. This was 
done in the presence of the parties and the witnesses, and with a first-hand 
exposure to and oversight of the entire proceedings. 
In reviewing such proceedings in the trial court, it has been recently said: 
"We will not overturn a trial court's alimony ruling as long as the 
court supports its ruling with adequate findings and exercises its 
discretion according to the standards we have set." Willey I. 866 p.2d at 
550. We review the trial court's conclusions of law with respect to 
alimony awards for correctness, but we will not reverse the court's 
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.7 
ISSUE NUMBER 1: CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT FOR RELIEF 
7
 Willey v. Willey. 914 P.2d 1149 (Utah App. 1996). 
8 
On the basis of the evidence as above reviewed, and the circumstances 
of the case as a whole, the decision of the trial judge awarding alimony of 
$500.00 per month for five years should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of December, 1997. 
Bennett P. Peterson 
Attorney for Appellee 
9 
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